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Abstract 
The relationship between government size and the unemployment rate is 
investigated using a panel error-correction model that describes both the short-run 
dynamics and long-run determination of the unemployment rate. Using data from twenty 
OECD countries from 1970 to 1999 and after correcting for simultaneity bias, we find 
that government size, measured as total government outlays as a percentage of GDP, 
plays a significant role in affecting the steady-state unemployment rate. Importantly, 
when government outlays are disaggregated, transfers and subsidies are found to 
significantly affect the steady-state unemployment rate while government purchases of 
goods and services play no significant role. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1970s, OECD countries on average have experienced increases in 
unemployment rates, but individual country experiences have varied considerably (Figure 
1). Have governments and their policies played a role in affecting these unemployment 
experiences? In seeking to answer this question, most studies have followed a 
disaggregated or program-specific approach. In these studies, variables are constructed to 
measure the effects of specific government programs or policies. In particular, changes in 
labor-market institutions, such as unemployment benefits, statutory minimum wages, 
employment protection legislations and tax wedges, have been examined extensively 
(Bean, et al., 1986, Oswald, 1997, Nickell, 1997, Nickell and Layard, 1999, Blanchard 
and Wolfers, 2000, Nickell, et al., 2005). The empirical results are mixed. For example, 
Oswald (1997) found that labor-market rigidities, such as overly generous unemployment 
benefits and high labor taxes do not seem to contribute to the high unemployment rates in 
Europe. But Nickell, et al. (2005) concluded that broad movements in unemployment 
rates across the OECD can be explained by shifts in labor-market institutions, such as 
employment protection legislations, unemployment benefits and labor taxes. 
The program-specific approach to assessing the role of government in affecting 
the unemployment rate is likely to give an incomplete and inaccurate picture. Specifying 
all the channels through which government programs might affect unemployment may 
not be possible. Even when major programs are investigated, their multidimensional 
characteristics make their measurement difficult: “Reducing them to quantitative indexes 
is not easy: how does one compare, for example, two unemployment insurance systems,   3 
if the first has more generous unemployment benefits, but also more conditionality of 
benefits on search effort?” (Blanchard, 2006, p.38).  
As an alternative to the program-specific approach, an aggregate approach uses 
government size, measured in various ways, as a portmanteau variable to capture the 
diverse channels by which government and its programs can affect the unemployment 
rate (Abrams (1999), Christopoulos et al.(2002, 2005), Feldmann (2006)).   This 
approach is not without its own drawbacks, however, and is subject to the same type of 
criticism levied on the monetarist’s reduced-form approach to explaining the transmission 
mechanism for money: a “black box” approach that may mistake the direction of 
causation. Regardless, the aggregate approach has proven to be highly consistent in 
finding that government size has played a crucial role in a nation’s unemployment 
experiences. 
  Abrams (1999) was the first to apply the aggregate approach to explaining 
unemployment rates. Using data from twenty OECD countries, Abrams found support for 
a positive link between a nation’s steady-state unemployment rate and its government 
size (total government outlays as a percentage of GDP).
1 Feldmann (2006) estimated a 
static panel data model with country random effects for 19 industrial countries. He also 
found that the larger the size of government the higher the unemployment rate.
2 It is 
important to note that the results from Abrams (1999) and Feldmann (2006) are subject to 
potential simultaneity bias because in both studies all regressors, including government 
                                                 
1 Abrams (1999) is a rather preliminary study because the regression equation has only one explanatory 
variable, i.e., government size and the pooled OLS estimation is unable to control for the unobserved 
country characteristics. 
2 Compared to other studies, Feldmann (2006) used a different measure of government size, i.e., the 
“Economic Freedom of the World” index and its four component indices, which measure the extent of 
government consumption, transfers and subsidies, government enterprises and investment, and a nation’s 
top marginal income tax rate, respectively. The indices are developed by Gwartney and Lawson (2004).   4 
size measures, are treated as exogenous while in fact government size is likely to be 
jointly determined with the unemployment rate. For instance, government spending on 
unemployment benefits tends to increase during recessions. Thus, their estimated positive 
effect of government size on the unemployment rate could simply be an artifact of 
reverse causality.  
Several studies have also combined time series techniques with the aggregate 
approach to analyze the unemployment dynamics. Christopoulos and Tsionas (2002) 
focused on the short-run dynamics by estimating bivariate vector autoregressive models 
for ten OECD countries. They found unidirectional causality running from government 
size to the unemployment rate. Given the well-known fact that bivariate VARs are very 
restrictive and the estimated relationship tends to be unstable when additional variables 
are included in the model, Wang and Abrams (2011) specified a more general VAR 
model. They also found unidirectional causality from government size to the 
unemployment rate. Christopoulos, et al. (2005) employed panel cointegration tests and 
concluded that there is a positive long-run relationship between government size and the 
unemployment rate and that causality runs one-way from government size to the 
unemployment rate.
3 
  We seek to further test the relationship between government size and the 
unemployment rate by developing an error-correction model, which describes both the 
                                                 
3 The conclusions in Christopoulos, et al. (2005) should be taken with caution. First, there is no direct link 
between the presence of cointegration and the direction of causality. Secondly, in residual-based 
cointegration tests such as the panel cointegration tests employed in Christopoulos, et al. (2005), alternating 
the dependent variable in cointegration regression often yields conflicting results. In such cases, 
interpretation of test results can be tricky. In Christopoulos, et al. (2005), the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can be rejected when the unemployment rate is used as the dependent variable in the 
cointegrating regression, but not so when government size is the dependent variable. The inconsistent test 
results should be interpreted as a lack of cointegration (long-run relationship) between government size and 
the unemployment rate rather than unidirectional causality.    5 
short-run dynamics and long-run determination of the unemployment rate. We 
hypothesize that the steady-state unemployment rate, the rate that the economy gravitates 
towards in the long run,
4 is determined by government size and various institutional 
factors while short-run fluctuations in the unemployment rate are affected by business 
cycles and inflation shocks. Our model and estimation method allow for the unobserved 
country characteristics and explicitly control for simultaneity bias. The empirical study is 
based on a panel of twenty OECD countries from 1970 to 1999.
5 Our main conclusions 
are: (1) increases in government size, measured as total government outlays as a 
percentage of GDP, tend to raise the steady-state unemployment rate; (2) different types 
of government outlays have different effects on the steady-state unemployment rate, with 
transfers and subsidies having a large significant effect and government purchases having 
an insignificant effect; and (3) available measures of labor-market institutions play no 
significant role in affecting the steady-state unemployment rate.  
It should be noted that the error-correction model that we develop is a reduced-
form model. Like any reduced-form models, it tries to establish a statistical association 
between the unemployment rate and government outlays, which do not necessarily prove 
a behavior causal relationship.
6 In contrast, structural models specify the mechanisms 
through which government outlays might affect the unemployment rate. However, 
structural models are only as good as the explicit structures that are specified. If 
                                                 
4 Our steady-state unemployment rate is the “natural rate” for the economy.  In our steady state, the 
expected inflation rate equals the actual inflation rate.  This unemployment rate is also called NAIRU, the 
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment.   
5 We terminate the sample in 1999 due to the adoption of the euro, which causes a structural break. More 
discussion on this issue can be found in Section 5. Countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.  
6 The VAR models in Christopoulos and Tsionas (2002) and Wang and Abrams (2011) are also reduced-
form models. Likewise, the unidirectional Granger causality found in these papers should not be taken as 
evidence of a behavior causal relationship.   6 
important structural channels are omitted, the structural estimates will give a misleading 
picture. We do not know all, perhaps not even most, of the structural linkages between 
the many government programs and work incentives. In addition, most public-policy 
programs differ substantially in detail across countries. This raises the possibility of 
measurement errors for structural models. 
Section 2 provides some theoretical considerations linking government size to the 
steady-state unemployment rate. Section 3 briefly outlines the evolution of government 
size and unemployment rates in OECD countries between 1970 and 1999. Section 4 sets 
up the error-correction model and discusses several methodological issues. Empirical 
results are reported in Section 5. Sensitivity analysis is summarized in Section 6. Section 
7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Linking Government Size to Unemployment 
  Hall (1979) shows that a nation’s steady-state unemployment rate (
* U ), the long-
run rate that an economy gravitates towards after shocks have dissipated, depends only 
upon a finding rate (f) and a separation rate (s).   When an economy reaches its steady-
state unemployment rate, the number of people finding employment (the finding rate 
times the number unemployed) exactly equals the number of workers losing employment 
(the separation rate times the number of employed).  Mathematical manipulation of this 





*             (1) 
                                                 
7 See Hall (1979). This simplified equation assumes a constant size for the labor force.   7 
Factors that increase the separation rate or decrease the finding rate raise the 
steady-state unemployment rate. Clearly, various specific government programs can be 
expected to affect the finding and separation rates. For example, Feldstein (1976, 1978) 
found that unemployment insurance reduces the finding rate and raises the 
unemployment rate. Publicly provided health care, often a major component of 
government spending, is likely to affect both the separation and finding rates. A worker 
who knows that health care continues after quitting a job is more likely to quit thereby 
raising the separation rate; a member of the labor force who receives publicly provided 
health care during bouts of unemployment is likely to extend the bout of unemployment 
and lower the finding rate. Both of these effects, if operative, would raise the steady-state 
unemployment rate.  
   Karras (1993), on the other hand, noted that government expenditures on capital 
and infrastructure, types of public investment spending, tend to increase labor 
productivity (and the demand for labor) and cause negative wealth effects that increase 
labor supply. To the extent that these effects work to raise the finding rate, the steady-
state unemployment rate would fall. However, government consumption expenditures on 
capital and infrastructure do not necessarily raise labor productivity, especially when 
taking into account possible crowding-out effects on private investment spending. 
  The abovementioned specific programs merely illustrate some of the channels 
through which government programs might affect the unemployment rate. Total 
government outlays, a broad measure of government activity, serve to measure the 
combined effects of the outlays-cum-taxation of all programs. The question whether such 
an aggregative measure of government activity serves as a useful variable for explaining   8 
the steady-state unemployment rate must be resolved empirically. The answer to this 
question is important for assessing the social desirability of expanding the role of 
government in the economy and fiscal policies in basic macroeconomic models. For 
example, if government size affects the steady-state unemployment rate, it should be 
included as an argument in the long-run aggregate supply function. Changes in 
government outlays would then affect aggregate supply as well as aggregate demand in 
the traditional model.  
Our baseline model uses total government outlays to explain unemployment, but 
we also separate total government outlays into transfer outlays and government purchases 
of goods and services to see if these programs produce different effects as suggested by 
Karras (1993). We also experiment with various institutional and regulatory variables. 
These are discussed in detail in Section 5. 
 
3. Government Size and Unemployment: Stylized Facts from OECD Countries 
  Figure 1 plots the unemployment rate of each of the twenty OECD countries for 
the period 1970-1999.
8 Generally speaking, unemployment rates have increased over 
time with some dramatic increases occurring in some countries. The average 
unemployment rate was 2.4 percent in 1970 and increased to 7.1 percent in 1999.  
Figure 2 provides country graphs of total government outlays as a percentage of 
GDP (GO), which reveals substantial heterogeneity in individual country experience. For 
two countries in the sample, Ireland and the United Kingdom, GO decreased over the 
period. For the other countries, government size grew at various rates. GO rose by a mere 
                                                 
8 Subject to data availability.  Data for Germany includes only West Germany prior to merger with East 
Germany. Variable definitions and sources are given in the Appendix.   9 
1.9 percentage points for Netherlands, but by over 23 percentage points for Japan. 
Overall, there appears to be a secular increase in GO over the thirty-year period. The 
average GO increased from 33.6 percent in 1970 to 45.4 percent in 1999.   
  What types of government outlays increased over this period? To help answer this 
question, we disaggregate GO into two conceptually distinct categories: transfers and 
subsidies as a percentage of GDP (TR) and government purchases of goods and services 
as a percentage of GDP (G). Figures 3 and 4 provide country graphs of TR and G, 
respectively.
 9 On average, both G and TR have increased over time. Comparing 1970 
and 1999, transfers increased from 14 to 20 percent of GDP while government purchases 
increased from 19.6 to 25.4 percent of GDP. While G and TR increased by roughly the 
same amounts on average, substantial variations exist among countries. For example, 
almost all of Japan’s increases in GO came from increases in G while the vast majority of 
Spain’s came from increases in TR. 
  Clearly, over the last three decades of the twentieth century, unemployment rates 
and the size of government have increased on average in OECD countries. Can increases 
in unemployment rates be linked to the growth in government? If so, do government 
purchases of goods and services and transfer programs produce similar effects on the 
unemployment rate? The next two sections will shed some light on these issues.  
 
4. The Methodology 
Our empirical analysis of the unemployment dynamics starts with a two-equation 
error-correction model: 
                                                 
9 Data on Japan’s total government outlays (GO) are available for the full sample period. However, data on 
government purchases (G) and transfers (TR) are available only for the period 1970-1990.   10 
t i i t i t i t i X GOV U , , ,
*
, ' ,          (2) 
t i i t i t i t i t i t i INF GRO U U U , , , 1 ,
*
1 , , ) ( .     (3) 
For country i in period t, equation (2) describes the determination of the steady-state 
unemployment rate, and equation (3) captures the period-to-period evolution of the 
observed unemployment rate. In particular, the steady-state or natural long-run 
unemployment rate 
* U  is determined by government size, GOV, and a vector, X, of 
regulatory and labor market institutions including the minimum wage, trade union density 
rate, and the unemployment benefits replacement rate.
10 The period-to-period evolution 
of the observed unemployment rate,  t i U , , is assumed to be affected by three factors: (i) 
the deviation of the actual unemployment rate from its steady-state level in the previous 
period,  ) ( 1 ,
*
1 , t i t i U U ; (ii) the business cycle, measured by the real GDP growth rate, 
t i GRO , ;
11 and (iii) inflation shock,  t i INF, , which captures the short-run (expectation-
adjusted) “Phillips curve” effect.
 12  In equation (3),   should lie between 0 and 1, with 
larger value of  suggesting faster speed of adjustment to unemployment disequilibrium. 
Country fixed effects  i and  i  capture the unobserved country-specific characteristics, 
such as cultural, demographic, religious and legal factors, and time-invariant political and 
                                                 
10 Other labor-market institutions, such as employment protection legislations, strictness of unemployment 
benefit conditions, active labor market programs and degree of coordination in collective bargaining, have 
also been shown to have significant impacts on the unemployment rate. See Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskow et 
al. (1998), Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000), Feldmann (2006), Nickell et al. (2005), Belot and van Ours 
(2004), Botero et al. (2004). They are not included in our study due to the lack of time series data for the 
period considered. 
11 Theoretically, lagged real GDP growth should be used in equation (3) to reflect the business cycle effect 
since movements in the unemployment rate tend to lag the real GDP growth. However, as our sample 
consists of annual data, the current real GDP growth seems to be more appropriate. Empirically, we find 
that the current real GDP growth works better than the lagged one. 
12 For simplicity, we use the lagged inflation rate as a proxy for the expected inflation rate so that the first 
difference,  t i INF, , measures the unexpected inflation, the factor presumably driving the Phillips curve 
tradeoff. Phelps (1994, p.326) used the same variable as a proxy for demand shocks.    11 
labor-market institutions. Error terms  t i,  and  t i,  are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across i and over t.  
Since the steady-state unemployment rate is unobserved, we cannot estimate the 
error-correction model directly. Instead of using estimates or proxies for 
* U  (Abrams, 
1999), we reduce the two-equation error-correction model into a single equation 
t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i u X INF GRO GOV U U , 1 , , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , '     (4) 
where 
1 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  ,        (5) 
i i i v u  represents the country fixed effects and  t i t i t i , , ,  the i.i.d. error 
term. Hence, if we can estimate equation (4) consistently, we can then recover the 
parameters in the error-correction model using the relationships in equation (5).   
Note that equation (4) is a dynamic panel data model with country fixed effects. 
For dynamic panel data models, the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), 
or the generalized method-of-moment (GMM) estimators in general, is often the obvious 
estimator of choice because it is consistent under a variety of conditions.
13 To estimate 
equation (4), the Arellano-Bond estimator takes the following steps: (1) first-difference 
the equation to remove the fixed effect  i u ; and (2) apply a GMM estimator to the first-
differenced equation. Since unemployment, growth, inflation and government size are 
likely to be jointly determined, to control for simultaneity bias, we treat  t i GRO ,  and 
                                                 
13 The Arellano-Bond estimator (or GMM estimators in general) is consistent whether a dynamic panel data 
model has fixed or random effects, see Hsiao (2003). For a random-effect model, it remains consistent even 
if regressors are correlated with the random effects. Our model is specified to contain fixed effects because 
fixed-effect models are in general more appropriate in macroeconomic analysis than random-effect models, 
see Judson and Owen (1999). Judson and Owen also discussed the finite-sample performance of the 
Arellano-Bond estimator for the typical macroeconomic panel datasets.   12 
t i INF,  as endogenous,  1 ,t i U  and  1 ,t i GOV  as predetermined, and the institutional 
variables as strictly exogenous.
14 The instruments for the Arellano-Bond estimator 
include lagged levels of the dependent variable, lagged levels of the predetermined and 
endogenous regressors, and differences of the strictly exogenous regressors.  
Several important hypotheses can be tested based on the estimation results of the 
error-correction model. A positive and significant estimate of  would support what 
Christopolous and Tsionas (2002) and Christopolous, et al. (2005) have called the 
“Abrams curve”, that is, a positive association between government size and the steady-
state unemployment rate. A negative and significant estimate of   would point to the 
short-run Phillips curve tradeoff between inflation and unemployment rate. Business 
cycle theory suggests that  <0. If Okun’s law applies to our study, we would expect that 
3 . 0 , that is, for every one percentage point increase in the real GDP growth rate, 
there is roughly a 0.3 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate. 
Our two-equation error-correction model provides some major improvements 
over those adopted in the existing literature. First, equation (2) alone may seem to suggest 
a contemporaneous relationship between the unemployment rate and government size, 
which is unrealistic. However, by combining equations (2) and (3), our error-correction 
model is actually path-dependent. This is easily seen in equation (4), the dynamic panel 
model. Specifically, by including the lagged unemployment as an explanatory variable, 
                                                 
14 We follow the standard practice of treating the labor market institutions as exogenous, although in the 
long run institutions are not exogenously determined but vary in response to the evolution of the 
unemployment rate. Since the Arellano-Bond estimator is essentially a GMM estimator of the first 
difference of equation (4), treating the labor market institutions as exogenous is harmless as long as 
0 ) ( , 1 , t i t i X E , which is true if  0 ) ( , , t i s i X E  for all  t s . Since our analysis is based on 
annual data and changes in institutions take time, we can safely assume that labor market institutions are 
uncorrelated with current and further unemployment shock and are hence exogenous.    13 
the unemployment rate in any given period is projected to depend on the entire history of 
government size while the effect of government size diminishes over time.
15 In contrast, 
the existing empirical studies have used static models and have hence overlooked the 
impact of past government size on current unemployment. Secondly, by distinguishing 
endogenous ( t i GRO ,  and  t i INF, ), predetermined ( 1 ,t i U  and  1 ,t i GOV ) and strictly 
exogenous regressors (institutional variables), our model estimation is not subject to 
simultaneity bias. Other studies have made no such distinctions. In addition, Abrams 
(1999) used 5-year averages both to obtain a proxy for the unobserved steady-state 
unemployment rate and to take out the business cycle effect. Unfortunately, using period-
averaged data are likely to aggravate the simultaneity problem.
16 Third, our study is 
based on annual data which allows better exploration of the within-country variations. 
This is important for cross-country studies where samples tend to cover a relative short 
period of time. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present briefly the estimation results of equation (4), followed 
by details of the empirical findings from the error-correction model of equations (2) and 
(3). Our results are obtained using annual observations from twenty OECD countries for 
the period 1970-1999. We focus on the OECD countries because their data are of high 
                                                 




 where  ) 1 , 0 ( 1 if   in equation (3) is between 0 and 1. 
16 Suppose the true data generating process is  t i t i t i x y , , , , where  t i x ,  is predetermined so that 
t i x ,  is correlated with lagged values of t i,  but not the current t i, . There is no simultaneity problem if 
annual data is used to estimate the regression. However, if period-averaged data is used, then the estimated 
regression becomes  i i i x y . Since  i x  is correlated with i , the parameter estimates are 
therefore subject to the simultaneity bias.    14 
quality and cross-country compatibility. Our sample ends in 1999, which coincides with 
the introduction of the euro. Combining the pre-euro and post-euro periods will no doubt 
increase the sample size and make this study appear more up to date. But it will also 
subject our estimation results to the complications of a structural break.
17 Therefore, 
instead of taking up the ambitious task of investigating the relationship between 
government size and unemployment rate in the midst of a major structural break, we 
content ourselves with focusing on the pre-euro period. 
To obtain accurate parameter estimates, it is important that our sample display 
enough variations. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the pooled data. From 
these statistics and the time series plots in Figures 1-4, it is clear that substantial within- 
and across-country variations are present in our sample. As a preliminary step in the 
empirical analysis, we examine the country graphs of unemployment rates against 
government size variables (Figures 5-7). There appears to be a strong positive 
relationship between the unemployment rate and GO (total government outlays as a 
percentage of GDP), and between the unemployment rate and TR (transfers and subsidies 
as a percentage of GDP). However, the relationship between the unemployment rate and 
G (government purchases of goods and services as a percentage of GDP) seems much 
weaker. These observations are corroborated by the correlation coefficients in Table 2. 
We consider five model specifications. Specification 1, our baseline specification, 
uses GO as an overall measure of the government size and assumes that the steady-state 
                                                 
17 A few tests (e.g. Wacheter and Tzavalis (2004)) have been developed to detect a structural break in 
dynamic panel data models. But to the best of our knowledge, none of them allows for endogenous 
regressors. Furthermore, even if we know the timing of the break, it is not clear how to properly model it. 
Including a year dummy for the EMU is, in our opinion, naïve and inadequate. The unemployment 
dynamics may be dramatically different in the euro zone due to its single monetary policy and stringent 
fiscal policy rules. As a result, it may be necessary to set up a separate model for the EMU members in the 
post-euro period.                                        15 
unemployment rate is determined by both the government size and the labor-market 
institutions. In specification 2, we disaggregate GO and enter G and TR separately in 
equation (2) to capture any different effects these outlays might have on the 
unemployment rate.
18 Specifications 3 and 4 are obtained by dropping the labor-market 
institutions from specifications 1 and 2, respectively, and specification 5 is obtained by 
dropping government size from the baseline specification.  
OECD provides data on several regulatory and labor market institutions that seem 
on a priori grounds to be relevant for affecting the unemployment rate. Trade union 
density rate is a measure of the extent of union involvement in the labor market. If trade 
unions can successfully raise wages above the market clearing levels, we should expect 
higher union density to be associated with higher unemployment rate. Minimum wage 
measures the statutory minimum wage as a percentage of the nation’s median wage. High 
minimum wage can be expected to prevent labor market clearing, reduce the finding rate, 
and hence raise the unemployment rate, other things equal. Unemployment benefits 
replacement rate measures gross unemployment benefits as a percentage of the previous 
gross wage earnings. Presumably the higher the replacement rate, the lower the 
opportunity cost of unemployment and the lower the finding rate. While minimum wages 
and replacement rates are specific government programs and, as such, including them in 
equation (2) is not in keeping with the pure aggregative approach, they are so commonly 
used in other studies that we felt they should be included in our baseline specification.  
As will be seen, their inclusion or exclusion from the model has no effect on our findings.   
                                                 
18 It would be desirable to separate out government outlays on active labor market programs so that we can 
test if and to what extend such outlays would lower the unemployment rate. We are not able to do so due to 
lack of data in 1970s and early 1980s.   16 
Table 3 presents the one-step Arellano-Bond estimates of equation (4).
19 The five 
columns correspond to the five specifications described above. The Arellano-Bond 
estimator seems to be appropriate for these specifications as the Sargan tests cannot reject 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions and the second-order autocorrelation in 
t i,  is insignificant at any conventional level.
20  
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the error-correction model of equations 
(2) and (3), which are derived from the Arellano-Bond estimates of equation (4) and the 
relationships in equation (5). The five columns again correspond to the five model 
specifications. In the remaining of this section, we focus on the empirical findings from 
the error-correction model. 
As for the short-run dynamics (equation (3)), all five specifications yield similar 
results. As expected, the coefficients on both the real GDP growth and the unexpected 
inflation are negative and significant. In particular, for every one percentage point 
increase in the real GDP growth rate, there is roughly a 0.27 percentage point decrease in 
the unemployment rate, a result strikingly close to that reported by Okun (1962).
21 In 
contrast, the impact of unexpected inflation is much smaller. For every one percentage 
point increase in the unexpected inflation, there is merely a 0.08 percentage point 
decrease in the unemployment rate. The speed of adjustment to unemployment 
                                                 
19 The two-step Arellano-Bond estimates are not reported here because their standard errors tend to be 
biased downward in small samples, see Arellano and Bond (1991). 
20 The Arellano-Bond estimator is essentially a GMM estimator of the first difference of equation (4). Its 
consistency requires that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the error term of the first-differenced 
equation ( t i, ).  
21 Okun (1962), in his so-called Method 1, regressed the first difference in unemployment rate on a constant 
and the real GNP growth rate. The estimated coefficient on the real GNP growth rate was -0.3. Okun’s 
study differs from ours in terms of data, the regression equation and the estimation method.  In particular, 
Okun estimated his regressions by OLS and treated the real GNP growth rate as exogenous.   17 
disequilibrium ( ) is estimated to be 0.12 for specification 1 and 0.14 for specification 2, 
which suggests the half-life to convergence
22 being 4.7~5.4 years. 
In the long run (equation (2)), increases in government outlays tend to raise the 
steady-state unemployment rate.
23 In specification 1, government size is found to have a 
positive effect on the steady-state unemployment rate. The effect is both statistically and 
economically significant. A 10 percentage point increase in GO (e.g. total government 
outlays increase from 30% to 40% of GDP) leads to a 2.2 percentage point increase in the 
steady-state unemployment rate (e.g. unemployment rate increases from 4% to 6.2%). 
This is somewhat less than the impact reported by Abrams (1999) and Christopoulos et 
al. (2005), who found that a 10 percentage point increase in GO raises the steady-state 
unemployment rate by approximately 3 percentage points. In specification 2, we find that 
transfers and subsidies have a positive and significant effect on the steady-state 
unemployment rate, while the effect of government purchases is positive but 
insignificant. A 10 percentage point increase in TR (e.g. transfers and subsidies increase 
from 10% to 20% of GDP) leads to a 5.7 percentage point increase in the steady-state 
unemployment rate. The results remain virtually the same when G is dropped from the 
regression.
24 In both specifications, the regulatory and labor-institution variables do not 
seem to play a significant role in the determination of the steady-state unemployment 
rate. When we drop the labor institutions from the regression, the results on the remaining 
variables hardly change (specifications 3 and 4).  
                                                 
22 The half-life to convergence is the expected number of years needed for the initial unemployment 
disequilibrium to be reduced by half. It is calculated as  ) 1 ln( / ) 2 ln( . 
23 The positive link between government size and the steady-state unemployment rate is not likely to be 
spurious due to considerable across-country variations in both variables.  
24 Details are available upon request.   18 
The lack of significance of the labor-market institutions seems to contradict the 
conventional wisdom. One may suspect that the unemployment effects of institutions are 
picked up by the government outlays. However, when we drop the government size 
variable from the regression, labor-market institutions remain insignificant (specification 
5). This result is broadly consistent with some of the previous studies that have followed 
the program-specific approach (Oswald, 1997). It appears that some of the institutions 
might not provide binding constraints, while others do not accurately describe the labor 
market structure. For example, the statutory minimum wage in OECD countries often 
proves to be too low to have a significant effect on the unemployment rate of adult men. 
Moreover, union density may not be an accurate measure of union involvement in the 
labor market as union wage negotiations in many countries cover a large proportion of 
workers that are not union members (Nickell, 1997).
25  
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our empirical findings from five 
aspects: (i) sensitivity to different measures of government size; (ii) sensitivity to 
additional explanatory variables; (iii) stability of parameter estimates cross country and 
over time; (iv) sensitivity to heteroskedastic error terms; and (v) sensitivity to different 
instrument sets used in the Arellano-Bond estimator. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the 
sensitivity analysis for specifications 1 and 2 of the error-correction model, respectively. 
To facilitate comparison, columns (1) and (2) in Table 4, which we shall refer to as the 
                                                 
25 Collective bargaining coverage (measured as the percentage of employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreements) is likely to be a better measure of union’s role in wage determination. In many 
OECD countries, there is a wide gap between density and coverage. Taking France as an example, its 
density is about 10% but coverage is 95% in 1994. Unfortunately, OECD data on collective bargaining 
coverage is very limited, available only for 1980, 1990 and 1994.   19 
“benchmark”, are copied into column (a) in Table 5 and column (a) in Table 6, 
respectively 
Different measures of government size 
We re-estimate the model by replacing the OECD’s total government outlays as a 
percentage of GDP (GO) with the World Bank’s broadest measure of government size, 
total government expenditures as a percentage of GDP (GE).
26  The results are very close 
to the benchmark, except that GE is estimated to have a larger effect on the steady-state 
unemployment rate than the GO (column (b) in Table 5). A 10 percentage point increase 
in GE leads to a 4.0 percentage point increase in the steady-state unemployment rate. 
However, once we disaggregate total government expenditures into transfers and 
government purchases, all coefficient estimates become very close to the benchmark 
(column (b) in Table 6). 
Additional explanatory variables 
Several studies have considered the real interest rate as a determinant of the long-
run unemployment rate (Phelps, 1994, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In addition, oil 
price shocks are often expected to affect the short-term unemployment fluctuations. 
Therefore, we experimented by adding the real interest rate to equation (2) and an oil 
price shock to equation (3), where the oil price shock is measured as the first difference 
of the annual percentage change in nominal oil prices. In applying the Arellano-Bond 
estimator to equation (4), we treat the lagged real interest rate as predetermined and oil 
price shock as strictly exogenous. The results are reported in columns (c) in Tables 5 and 
                                                 
26 GO differs from GE, in part, because the former includes consolidated accounts that would include some 
outlays from non-federal governments. Some researcher have used GO (e.g., Abrams, 1999) and others 
have used GE (e.g., Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2002, and Christopoulos, et al., 2005). Definitions for these 
variables are provided in the Appendix.   20 
6. The real interest rate is found to have a positive and significant effect while the effect 
of the oil price shock is insignificant. The effect of total government outlays is very close 
to the benchmark. While the effect of government purchases turns negative, it remains 
statistically insignificant. The positive effect of transfers and subsidies becomes 
considerably larger than the benchmark. Union density becomes positive and significant 
in specification 1 while unemployment benefits become negative and significant in 
specification 2. There is no significant change in the coefficient estimate on 
unemployment disequilibrium, real GDP growth or inflation shock, or the estimated half-
life to convergence. 
Stability of parameter estimates cross country and over time 
To see if the parameters are stable cross country, we re-estimate the model using 
two sub-samples. First, we notice that Japan and Spain represent potential outliers. 
Almost all of Japan’s dramatic growth in government over the period was in the form of 
government purchases, while Spain’s was in transfers and subsidies (Figures 2-4). 
Spain’s unemployment rate rose dramatically while Japan’s increased little (Figure 1). To 
see if the results reported in section 5 are driven by these two countries, we dropped both 
Spain and Japan from the sample. The results are almost identical to the benchmark 
(columns (d) in Tables 5 and 6). Secondly, unemployment rates in the European and non-
European countries may have followed different dynamics. Therefore, we re-estimate the 
model using data from the 16 OECD-European countries. The results are again almost 
identical to the benchmark (columns (e) in Tables 5 and 6).    21 
To see if the parameters are stable over time, we re-estimate the model using sub-
samples 1970-1989 and 1980-1999, respectively.
27 The results based on sub-sample 
1970-1989 differ slightly from the benchmark (columns (f) of Tables 5 and 6). The effect 
of real GDP growth on the short-run unemployment dynamics is smaller and the effect of 
transfers and subsidies on the steady-state unemployment rate is larger as compared to 
the benchmark. In contrast, the results based on sub-sample 1980-1999 differ more 
significantly from the benchmark (columns (g) of Tables 5 and 6). The effects of total 
government outlays, real GDP growth and inflation shocks are larger than the benchmark. 
In addition, some of the labor-market institutions turn significant at the 5% or 10% level. 
Increases in union density and unemployment benefits seem more likely to raise the 
steady-state unemployment rate in the later years of our sample than in the earlier years. 
Overall, the findings reported in section 5 seem robust to changes in the estimation 
sample.  
Heteroskedastic error terms 
The results in Section 5 are obtained under the assumption that the error term  t i,  
in equation (4) is homoskedastic. To allow for heteroscedastic errors, we re-calculate the 
t-statistics using the robust estimates of the standard errors (columns (h) in Tables 5 and 
6). Although the t-statistics are significantly reduced for total government outlays, 
transfers and subsidies and real GDP growth, our conclusions are not affected by these 
changes. In particular, the significance level of total government outlays is reduced from 
1% to 5%. Transfers and subsidies, unemployment disequilibrium, real GDP growth and 
                                                 
27 It is probably more informative to re-estimate our model using data from each of the three decades. 
However, the decade sub-samples are too small to make any reliable comparison.   22 
inflation shock remain significant at the 1% level, while government purchases and the 
labor-market institutions remain insignificant. 
Different instrument sets 
In Section 5, the Arellano-Bond estimator is constructed using the “optimal” 
instrument set.
28 While theoretically, adding more instruments (or moment conditions) 
would improve the asymptotic efficiency of the estimator, the finite-sample bias can be 
quite severe as the number of moment conditions expands, outweighing the gains in 
efficiency (Ziliak, 1997). This is because the Arellano-Bond estimator uses lagged values 
of the endogenous and predetermined variables as instruments and lags dated far into the 
past have weak correlation with the endogenous regressors. So we experimented with 
instrument sets that consist of fewer lags of the endogenous and predetermined variables, 
the results are very close to the benchmark.
29  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
  Although many empirical studies have been done on the effect of government size 
on economic growth
30, the effect of government size on the unemployment rate has 
received little attention. In addition, the few studies that did look at this issue suffer a 
number of econometric problems that could render their conclusions invalid.  
The aggregate approach and our error-correction model provide new insights into 
and additional support for the hypothesis that government size plays a significant role in 
affecting a nation’s steady-state unemployment rate.  Our findings are not subject to 
                                                 
28 The “optimal” instrument set for the Arellano-Bond estimator consists of levels of the dependent variable 
and endogenous regressors lagged by two or more periods, levels of the predetermined regressors lagged by 
one or more periods, and first differences of the strictly exogenous regressors.  
29 Detailed results are not reported here but available upon request. 
30 See Agell et al. (1997) for a review.    23 
simultaneity bias or reverse causality, a significant improvement over the previous 
studies, such as Abrams (1999) and Feldmann (2006). Importantly, we find that 
government transfers and subsidies produce a significantly different impact on the 
unemployment rate than do government purchases of goods and services. While increases 
in transfers and subsidies are linked to higher steady-state unemployment rates, we find 
no significant role for government purchases, given the level of aggregation used in this 
study.  
  Our estimates for the magnitude of the effect of transfers on the unemployment 
rate provide a straightforward explanation for Eurosclerosis, the hardening of Europe’s 
economic arteries. On average, transfers and subsidies in the 16 OECD-European 
countries have increased by 6.7 percent of GDP between 1970 and 1999.
31 Our model 
(Table 4, specification 2) would project approximately a 3.8 percentage point increase in 
the steady-state unemployment rate. In contrast, the actual unemployment rates of these 
countries have increase by an average of 5.8 percent between 1970 and 1999. Thus, our 
model suggests that two-third of the secular rise in unemployment rates in OECD-Europe 
can be attributed to increases in government transfers and subsidies.
 32   
  Recent health care reform in the United States can be expected to raise the steady- 
state unemployment rate.  While it is difficult to estimate to what extent the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 would increase government transfers and 
subsidies, as a thought experiment, should the program raise transfers as a percent of 
                                                 
31 Data for some countries are not available for all years. We took the closest years available in calculating 
changes in the transfers and subsidies and the employment rates. 
32 Transfers and subsidies are estimated to have a much larger effect when interest rate and oil price shock 
are added to the model (column (c) in Table 6). For a 6.7 percentage point increase in TR, this model 
specification predicts a 5.3% increase in the steady state unemployment rate, which is strikingly close to 
the 5.8% increase in the observed unemployment rates.   24 
GDP by 5 percent, our model suggests a rise in the U.S. steady-state unemployment rate 
of approximately 2.8 percent.
 33 Since the U.S. “full employment” unemployment rate is 
currently estimated to be around 5 percent, the new steady-state unemployment rate 
would rise to 7.8 percent.  This would put the U.S. close to Western Europe’s steady-state 
unemployment rate. 
 
                                                 
33 The original Administration’s estimate was that the recent health care reform was going to add nothing to 
cost. However, administration’s spending projections for health care legislation have never come close to 
the actual expenditures. Take Medicare for example. Enacted in 1965, the initial projection was that it 
would cost $9 billion a year by 1990.  The actual figure for 1990 turned out to be $67 billion.   25 
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Unemployment rate: Unemployment as a percentage of total labor force. Source: OECD 
Historical Statistics, various issues. 
GO: Total outlays of (consolidated) government as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD 
Historical Statistics, various issues. 
GE: Central government nonrepayable current and capital expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
TR: Central government subsidies and other current transfers as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
Real GDP growth rate: Annual percentage change in real GDP measured in U.S. dollar. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
Inflation shock: First difference of the CPI-based inflation rate. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (2004).  
Real interest rate: Money market interest rate minus the CPI-based inflation rate. Source: 
International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Oil price shock: First difference of the percentage change in nominal oil prices. Source: 
International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Minimum wage: Statutory minimum wage as a percentage of a nation’s median wage. 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (2001). 
Trade union density rate: Percentage of employees that are trade union members. Source: 
OECD Labour Market Statistics (2001).   26 
Unemployment benefits replacement rate: Gross unemployment benefits as a percentage 
of the previous gross wage earnings. Data for odd years are available from OECD Labour 
Market Statistics (2001), data for even years are obtained using linear interpolation.   27 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Unemployment rate  6.75  4.43  0.20  23.80 
Total government outlays as % of GDP (GO)  45.66  9.48  20.80  69.80 
Government purchases as % of GDP (G)  25.39  6.66  1.16  48.13 
Transfers & subsidies as % of GDP (TR)  20.27  7.49  1.65  39.69 
Real GDP growth rate  2.69  2.41  -7.28  10.16 
Inflation shock  -0.19  2.79  -13.54  11.51 
Minimum wage   21.70  25.97  0  76.70 
Trade union density rate   45.34  18.97  8.30  91.10 
Unemployment benefits replacement rate   27.40  13.29  0.30  71.00 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix  
 
  Unemployment 
rate 
Total government 
outlays as % of 
GDP (GO) 
Government 
purchases as % of 
GDP (G) 
Transfers & 
subsidies as % 












Unemployment rate  1.00                 
Total government outlays 
as % of GDP (GO) 
0.27  1.00               
Government purchases as 
% of GDP (G) 
0.04  0.62  1.00             
Transfers & subsidies as 
% of GDP (TR) 
0.30  0.72  -0.11  1.00           
Real GDP growth rate  -0.06  -0.21  -0.12  -0.16  1.00         
Inflation shock  -0.18  -0.12  -0.07  -0.09  0.05  1.00       
Minimum wage   0.25  -0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  1.00     
Trade union density rate   -0.17  0.41  0.32  0.23  -0.01  -0.01  -0.55  1.00   
Unemployment benefits 
replacement rate  
0.27  0.54  0.07  0.62  -0.09  -0.08  0.08  0.16  1.00 
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Table 3: Arellano-Bond Estimates of the Reduced-Form Model --- Equation (4) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










Total government outlays as % of GDP ( 1 ,t i GO )  0.026*** 
(2.97) 
  0.028*** 
(3.32) 
   
Government purchases as % of GDP ( 1 ,t i G )    0.013 
(1.40) 
  0.013 
(1.44) 
 
Transfers & subsidies as % of GDP ( 1 ,t i TR )    0.079*** 
(4.90) 
  0.075*** 
(5.16) 
 
























    0.002 
(0.46) 




    0.011 
(1.53) 




    0.007 
(1.02) 
           










Arellano-Bond test for 1










Arellano-Bond test for 2










Estimated variance of the error term  t i,   0.884  0.854  0.882  0.851  0.916 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics associated with coefficient estimates or p-values associated with test statistics. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively.  
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Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Long-run parameters --- Equation (2)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Total government outlays as % of GDP  (GO)  0.219*** 
(3.16) 
  0.237*** 
(3.59) 
   
Government purchases as % of GDP  (G)    0.094 
(1.44) 
  0.094 
(1.48) 
 
Transfers & subsidies as % of GDP  (TR)    0.574*** 
(5.10) 
  0.549*** 
(5.57) 
 




    0.017 
(0.45) 




    0.114 
(1.60) 




    0.074 
(1.00) 
Short-run parameters --- Equation (3)           
Unemployment disequilibrium ( 1 ,
*































           
Half-life to convergence (years)  5.44  4.71  5.58  4.74  6.65   34 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: Error-Correction Model, Specification 1 
 

















Long-run parameters --- Equation (2)  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h) 
Total government outlays as % of GDP (GO)
a  0.219*** 
(3.16) 












Total government expenditures as % of GDP (GE)
b    0.396*** 
(4.79) 
           
Real interest rate       0.325*** 
(3.31) 
         





































































































Oil price shock      -0.007 
(-0.09) 
         
                 
Half-life to convergence (years)  5.44  4.72  5.06  5.77  5.60  5.37  4.55  5.44 
a: general government figures 
b: central government figures 
 
Notes:  
1.  Column (a) corresponds to column 1 in Table 4.  
2.  Full sample consists of 20 countries over the period 1970-1999. 
3.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Error-Correction Model, Specification 2 
 
















Long-run parameters --- Equation (2)  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h) 
Government purchases as % of GDP (G)
a  0.094 
(1.44) 












Government purchases as % of GDP (G’)
b    0.079 
(0.41) 
           
















Real interest rate      0.278*** 
(3.68) 
         





































































































Oil price shock      -0.018 
(-0.25) 
         
                 
Half-life to convergence (years)  4.71  4.88  3.99  4.86  4.77  4.25  4.30  4.71 
a: general government figures 
b: central government figures 
 
Notes:  
1.  Column (a) corresponds to column 2 in Table 4.  
2.  Full sample consists of 20 countries over the period 1970-1999. 
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Figure 7: Unemployment Rate vs. Government Purchases in OECD Countries
(1970−1999)